Article
Details
Citation
Bowen J (2020) Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50 (4), pp. 427-443. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.57
Abstract
The Will Theory of Rights says that having control over another¡¯s duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory¡¯s focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one cannot both be faithful to the theory¡¯s focus on normative control as the grounds of rights and achieve extensional adequacy.
Keywords
Rights; directed duties; Will Theory; autonomy; control
Journal
Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume 50, Issue 4
| Status | Published |
|---|---|
| Funders | |
| Publication date | 31/05/2020 |
| Publication date online | 23/01/2020 |
| Date accepted by journal | 01/01/2020 |
| ISSN | 0045-5091 |
| eISSN | 1911-0820 |