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Article

Qualitative interviewing as measurement

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Citation

Paley J (2010) Qualitative interviewing as measurement. Nursing Philosophy, 11 (2), pp. 112-126. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1466-769X.2010.00436.x

Abstract
The attribution of beliefs and other propositional attitudes is best understood as a form of measurement, however counter-intuitive this may seem. Measurement theory does not require that the thing measured should be a magnitude, or that the calibration of the measuring instrument should be numerical. It only requires a homomorphism between the represented domain and the representing domain. On this basis, maps measure parts of the world, usually geographical locations, and ¡®belief¡¯ statements measure other parts of the world, namely people's aptitudes. Having outlined an argument for this view, I deal with an obvious objection to it: that self-attribution of belief cannot be an exercise in measurement, because we are all aware, from introspection, that our beliefs have an intrinsically semantic form. Subsequently, I turn to the philosophical and methodological ramifications of the measurement theoretic view. I argue, first, that it undermines at least one version of constructivism and, second, that it provides an effective alternative to the residually Cartesian philosophy that underpins much qualitative research. Like other anti-Cartesian strategies, belief-attribution-as-measurement implies that the objective world is far more knowable than the subjective one, and that reality is ontologically prior to meaning. I regard this result as both plausible and welcome.

Keywords
philosophy of science; qualitative research; epistemology; methodology; subjective experience; social constructionism; Spirituality; Philosophy, Nursing

Journal
Nursing Philosophy: Volume 11, Issue 2

StatusPublished
Publication date30/04/2010
Date accepted by journal01/01/1990
URL
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
ISSN1466-7681
eISSN1466-769X